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RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
IN CATHOLIC TRADITION t
GIACOMO CARDINAL LERCARO*
TOLERANCE IS A PARADOXICAL CONCEPT. It consists in permitting
what one knows certainly to be an evil or an error. Permissio
negativa mali (negative permission of evil), the theologians define it
-negative, because the permission in no way implies encourage-
ment of the evil.
It would follow, therefore, that tolerance is not a virtue in the strict
sense of the term. But virtue sanctions and requires the practice of
tolerance, for the evil or error it permits is always in the interests
of a greater good that is thereby defended or promoted.
Tolerance finds its basic justification in the analogy between human
law and the divine law which governs the universe. St. Thomas Aquinas
taught:
Human government is derived from divine government which it should
imitate. Though God is all-powerful and sovereignly good, He permits
the occurrence of evil in the universe which He could prevent. He does
so in order that the suppression of evil may not entail the suppression of
greater goods or even beget worse evils. Similarly in the case of human
government, those who govern well will tolerate evil in order to foster
good or prevent worse evil.1
Leo XIII returned to this thought in his encyclical "Libertas ' ' 2 when
he said:
With the discernment of a true Mother, the Church weighs the great
burden of human weakness and well knows the course along which the
actions of men are being borne in this our age. For this reason, while not
conceding any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does
not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth
and justice for the sake of avoiding some greater evil or preserving some
t Translated by the CATHOLIC MIND from the French version of J. Thomas-
d'Hoste which appeared in DOCUMENTATION CATHOLIQUE, Paris, March 15, 1959.
Reprints are available from the America Press, 920 Broadway, N .Y.
* Archbishop of Bologna.
1 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 10, art. 11, obj. 3.
2 ACTA LEONIS XlIl 205.
greater good. God Himself in His Provi-
dence, though infinitely good and power-
ful, permits evil to exist in the world,
partly that greater good may not be im-
peded and partly that greater evil may not
ensue. In the government of states it is not
forbidden to imitate the Ruler of the
world; and, as the authority of man is
powerless to prevent every evil, it has, as
St. Augustine says, "to overlook and leave
unpunished many things which are pun-
ished, and rightly, by divine Providence." 3
If, in certain circumstances, human law
can and should tolerate evil for the sake of
the common good - and for this reason
alone - this does not mean that it can ap-
prove of or wish evil for its own sake.
Being in itself the privation of good, evil is
opposed to the common welfare which the
human legislator must seek out and pro-
mote to the best of his ability. Human law
should strive to imitate God who, though
He allows evil to exist in the world, "wills
neither that it come to pass nor fail to come
to pass. He simply permits it. And that is
good."4 This single brief formula of the
Angelic Doctor contains the entire Catholic
doctrine on tolerance.
In the allocution to the Italian Catholic
jurists on 3rd December, 1953, Pius XII
remarked:
Hence the affirmation that religious and
moral error must always be impeded when
it is possible, because toleration of them is
in itself immoral, is not valid absolutely
and unconditionally. Moreover, God has
not given to human authority such an ab-
solute and universal control in matters of
faith and morality. Such a command is
unknown to the common convictions of
mankind, to Christian conscience, to the
3 ST. AUGUSTINE, DE LIB. ARBITR., Lib. 1, cap. 6,
num. 14.
4 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I, q. 19, art. 9, ad 3.
7 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1961
sources of Revelation and to the practice
of the Church. To omit here other scrip-
tural texts which are adduced in support of
this argument, Christ in the parable of the
cockle gives the following advice: let the
cockle grow in the field of the world to-
gether with the good seed in view of the
harvest.5 The duty of repressing moral
and religious error cannot therefore be an
ultimate norm of action. It must be sub-
ordinate to higher and more general norms
which in particular circumstances permit,
and perhaps even seem to.indicate as the
better policy, toleration of error in order
to promote a greater good.
But what is the greater good which
justifies, even demands, tolerance on the
part of Catholics in respect to other relig-
ious confessions?
Prudence, in so far as it provides a man
with a correct insight into how he must act,
is the virtue generally recognized as justify-
ing tolerance. In our case, however, should
this prudence amount to mere practical
foresight? To put it graphically, are we pre-
vented from once again condemning the
heretic to the stake only because of the
peculiar historical situation of the Church
to-day? Or should tolerance proceed from
loftier principles, such as respect for the
truth or for the manner in which God acts
on the human soul?
Religious tolerance, we maintain, should
proceed from respect for the truth and for
the manner in which the human intellect
arrives at the truth, rather than from re-
spect for freedom in itself. Here we are
drawing a distinction between the Catholic
concept of tolerance and the ideas ex-
pressed by John Locke in his Letter on
Tolerance. Pius XI clarified the essential
elements of that distinction in his encyci-
5 Matt. xiii, 24-30.
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
cal, Non abbiamo bisogno, where he de-
clared:
. ..We are, as we stated above, happy
and proud to wage the good fight for the
liberty of consciences, not indeed for the
liberty of conscience, as someone, perhaps
inadvertently, has quoted us as saying. This
[liberty of conscience] is an equivocal ex-
pression, too often distorted to mean the
absolute independence of conscience which
is absurd in a soul created and redeemed
by God.
A False View
Before developing the Church's position
on tolerance, let us first view Catholic doc-
trine through the eyes of non-Catholics who
have been influenced by the secular press.
According. to the viewpoint commonly
called radical to-day the principle of reli-
gious tolerance is part and parcel of those
philosophical systems that are known as
relativism and philosophical historicism.
These systems teach that truth is human
rather than divine. They can be under-
stood in a twofold sense. I would call them
dogmatic, in so far as they have given rise
to a new form of religiosity called "the
religion of freedom." They may also be
called sceptical, in so far as they inspired
the decadent interpretations of historicism.
Renan, for example, considered himself the
embodiment of the spirit of tolerance when
he taught that all views of the world were,
in their essence, equally true. Similarly,
modern relativism claims to admit all posi-
tions save any which presents itself as ab-
solute truth.
Because it is under the influence of rela-
tivism, our modern secularist culture has
no alternative but to define the Catholic
position on tolerance through words which
have been attributed to the Catholic apolo-
gist, Louis Veuillot: "When we are a mi-
nority, we claim freedom for ourselves in
the name of your principles of tolerance;
when we are a majority, we deny freedom
to you in the name of our own principles."
(Actually Veuillot never made any such
statement.)
At this point it is most important to re-
call the thesis which lays the foundation
for the secularist perspective of history.
The proposition that a transcendent reli-
gion must lead to intolerance is necessary to
the secularist view. That is why all secular-
ists hold it, even the most moderate. Their
position is the result of an historical judg-
ment according to which the Church ex-
hausted its positive civilizing function in
the Middle Ages. To-day it is unable to
provide the spiritual ferment necessary for
the development of civil life. It is con-
cerned only with its own survival. In its
nostalgia for the past, the secularist main-
tains, the Church resists the modern world
and finds its strength in the inevitable crises
which accompany historical progress.
In this view, the Church, from the Coun-
ter-Reformation on, inevitably became the
centre around which every type of conserv-
atism rallied. The Church found it possible
to ally herself with the established order,
and even to take on the colouring of its
strongest ally. Thus, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the secularists maintain, when the
ultimate victory of the ancien rdgime still
seemed possible, the Church was anti-Lib-
eral. To-day it is ready to borrow the
Liberal ideology proper to the bourgeoisie.
The secularist would argue, therefore,
that the Church to-day is ready to accept
the principle of tolerance only because she
would be otherwise incurably impotent in
the modern world.
Adolph Harnack, the Protestant Liberal
historian, expressed most clearly the idea
that intolerance and transcendent truth
went hand in hand. In 1925 he wrote: "We
would again see raging the religious perse-
cutions the Catholic churches are forced
to employ when they have attained power.
Their concept of the nature of the Church
and of the nature of obedience in matters
of faith demands persecution."
Other authors go so far as to pretend
that intolerance, in the eyes of the Church,
is the logical consequence of the virtue of
charity. Indeed, they argue, since the
Church believes that membership is a nec-
essary moral condition if man is to attain
eternal salvation, then its transformation
into an institution of power and the de-
velopment of an inquisitorial character be-
come for her a duty of mercy. As Nietzsche
put it, it is therefore not charity, but the
impotence of charity which prevents Catho-
lics from once again setting fire to the
stakes. Croce, who furnished the cultural
ammunition for the anticlerical Liberalism
made popular to-day by Il Mondo and
I'Expresso, held the same point of view.
So too did Jaspers, a secularist, but by no
means an extremist in his thinking:
The pretence to dogmatic exclusiveness
is constantly on the point of again prepar-
ing the lighted stake for the heretic. It is
in the nature of things, for, even though
the great number of believers lack the
stomach for violence or for the suppres-
sion of those who, in their point of view,
are infidels, the pretence to exclusiveness
common to all forms of biblical religion
demands it. 7
In all honesty one must admit that the
history of the nineteenth century seemed
6 DIE EICHE, 13, Munich, p. 295, cited in PRIBILLA,
UNITE CHRETIENNE ET TOLERANCE RELIGIEUS 189
(Paris 1950).
7 DER PHILOSOPHISCHE 73 (Munich 1948).
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at times to lend an air of truth to such
assertions as these. The realization that the
so-called "modern world" suffered from
fundamental error weighed heavily on the
mind of nineteenth-century Catholicism.
The new values of this world (though im-
perfect in their expression and in the logic
which accepted them) could not be made to
conform to the potentialities of Catholic
doctrine. As a result, Catholics felt im-
pelled, on the one hand, to turn back to the
Middle Ages in their search for a unique,
ideal model of Christian civilization and,
on the other, to confuse the concept of
freedom with the doctrine of naturalism,
thereby conceding far too much to their
adversaries.
Liberalism's Failure
But history, as far back as World War I,
has given the lie to the Modernists. The ex-
tremes of immanentism - the doctrine that
truth is human - has to-day become his-
toric fact in Marxism. It has given way
to what we call totalitarianism, to a form of
persecution not only of Christianity, but of
reason itself. In comparison, the harshness
and cruelty of the Inquisition, painted even
in their blackest aspects, pale into insig-
nificance.
Moreover, it has become obvious that
secularist Liberalism has proved incapable
of resolving the problem of the transition
to a democratic form of society in which
every development is considered to be the
end result of a purely social process.
Forced by its theoreticians to hold fast to
the "prophecy of the past," and to cherish
its vision of the world of yesterday, secular
Liberalism has forfeited its influential place
in history.
Catholics, on the contrary, have taken
up the defence of their own minority rights
RELIGIoUS TOLERANCE
and, where they find themselves a majority,
the freedom of all others. As true defend-
ers of human dignity, they point the way
toward the transition from a Liberal to a
democratic form of society.
For a precise notion of the Catholic
sense of tolerance, we must first dissociate
the teaching of the Church from the prin-
ciples of philosophical relativism. The
Church, conscious that she is the unique
legitimate representative of truth, must be
intolerant from the dogmatic point of view.
By that we mean that she must reject relig-
ious indifference. The Church insists on the
primary importance of the problem of truth
and on the fact that religious truths cor-
respond to metaphysical reality. These
truths are not mere symbolic attitudes. In-
deed, if the Church did not profess dog-
matic intolerance, she would in fact be
yielding to the relative concept of truth
taught by historicism, even to the point of
considering her own universality as a mere
historical accident dependent on the so-
called religions of freedom or of humanity.
Moreover, the Church must continue to
reject all forms of Averrhoism and Spin-
ozaism, systems which make a distinction
between the religion of the savants = phil-
osophy, in other words - and the religion
of the common man, which pretends to
adapt for the profane those truths which
only the philosopher can know in their ra-
tional form.
This means that the Church cannot
accept Modernism in any shape or form.
Were the Church to yield to Modernism,
it would mean putting the stamp of ap-
proval on the false values of the philoso-
phies of history and of the human relig-
ions of the nineteenth century. Catholicism
itself would disintegrate into a mere hu-
man religion in its anxiety to realize an
effective universality.
Dogmatic intolerance, therefore, logi-
cally follows from the idea that truth is
eternal. To deny the objectivity of truth is
to consider equally valid, even in different
historical circumstances, positions which,
from the religious and moral point of
view, are mutually contradictory.
All the papal condemnations of rational-
ism, therefore, from the Mirari vos of
Gregory XVI (1832) to the Syllabus of
Pius IX, retain their original force. It is
entirely erroneous to suppose that Leo
XIII indicated a new and different direc-
tion in the encyclicals Immortale Dei
(1885) and Libertas. Immortale Dei be-
gins, as a matter of fact, with a rejection
of the rationalist and naturalist concepts
of the state which have for their essential
and characteristic purpose the establish-
ment of the authority of man -in place of
that of God. Libertas clarifies perfectly the
relationship between what the Sovereign
Pontiff calls Liberalism in the language
of the period (what is to-day known as
radicalism) and a certain philosophy. The
promoters of-Liberalism correspond in the
social and civic order to the partisans of
rationalism and naturalism in philosophy,
for they would introduce the philosophical
principles of these systems into daily life.
It should be clearly understood that the
term naturalism signifies the rejection of
the supernatural to the point of fusing those
concepts which are proper to materialism
and historicism.
The Church then has no alternative but
to remain dogmatically intolerant. But dog-
matic intolerance should not beget an atti-
tude of civil or practical intolerance. This
is the distinction which Pius XI implied in
Non abbiamo bisogno. It follows from his
words that the defence of freedom has
nothing in common with the tenets of the
so-called religion of freedom. Genuine free-
dom is something quite distinct from the
false elevation of freedom to the rank of
religion. As Aubert has correctly observed,
in this text of Pius XI, and in analogous
texts of Popes who succeeded Leo XIII,
one can perceive the beginnings of a
theology of tolerance and of freedom of
conscience in the sense understood to-day.
He correctly adds that to work for a fully
satisfactory elaboration of this theology,
one liberated from the philosophical postu-
lates of Liberalism and rationalism, con-
stitutes one of the greatest tasks of the
modern theologian.
It remains now to show how, from the
idea of the eternity and objectivity of
truth - in a word, of the divinity of truth
- there follows the idea of respect for
freedom of consciences, while from the
notion that truth is human there follows
the extreme intolerance characteristic of
modern secularistic, totalitarian religions.
The idea of tolerance as exposed in
Catholic thought is extremely simple. In
substance it can be reduced to this: no one
should be forced against his will to accept
the Catholic faith. Respect for the truth
demands freedom of consent. A truth im-
posed is not a truth accepted as such.
Persuasion, Rosmini rightly noted, can-
not be forced.
With this in mind we can now turn to
a consideration of the greater good which
justifies religious tolerance on the part of
the Catholic - namely, the need for truth
to be accepted as truth.
What we mean is this: when one affirms
that truth is objective, by that very fact he
admits of a distinction between truth itself
and the act by which the individual yields
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to truth. Hence in recognizing the objec-
tivity of truth, the individual is, at the same
time, establishing the right to personal
freedom. Where truth is imposed, there
arises confusion between religion and poli-
tics. As history has so often demonstrated,
truth tends to become an instrument in the
hands of the state. According to the Chris-
tian conscience, the relationship of politics
to religion is one of subordination. But
where truth is imposed, religion and poli-
tics become entangled. This confusion of
religion and politics has been typical of
every form of paganism and reflects a situa-
tion which has been carried to extremes in
the totalitarian regimes of to-day.
Moreover, Christian teaching concerning
the presence of God in the human soul and
belief in the absolute, transcendent value
in history of the human person lays the
foundation for the use of persuasive
methods in matters of religious faith and
forbids coercion and violence. On the con-
trary, systems of thought which radically
deny the Christian concept of man, in so
far as they hold that the thought of man
is always determined by his historical situa-
tion, must necessarily lead to the most
rigid form of intolerance. Indeed, if man
must change as society changes, then it
makes no sense at all to speak of methods
of persuasion.
If this principle is valid for metaphysical
and moral truth, it is with more reason
valid in the domain of grace and faith.
No man can pretend to substitute for the
action of God in the human soul without
exposing himself to obvious sacrilege. No
modern theologian would hesitate to stig-
matize as a tyrant the political leader who
would impose a religion by force on his
subjects. Indeed, how could one think of
imposing Christianity without opening the
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
door to the worst sacrilege of all - that
against the Eucharist? Cajetan observes
that sacrilege against the Eucharist is the
most serious, because it directly offends the
humanity of Christ which is contained
therein.
In modern times the possibility of treat-
ing the problem of freedom of consciences
and civil tolerance from a new angle begins
with Leo XIII, who stated in Immortale
Dei:
The Church indeed deems it unlawful to
place various forms of divine worship on
the same footing as the true religion, but
does not, on that account, condemn those
rulers who, for the sake of securing some
greater good, or of hindering some great
evil, tolerate in practice that these various
forms of religion have a place in the State.
And in fact the Church is wont to take
earnest heed that no-one shall be forced
to embrace the Catholic faith against his
will, for, as St. Augustine wisely reminds
us, "Man cannot believe otherwise than of
his own free will."
s
Thus with Leo XIII the Church begins to
stress, not only dogmatic intolerance,
which must be strictly maintained, and the
historical evils that civil tolerance can
prevent, such as civil discord and wars of
religion, but also the positive good that can
come from religious liberty - namely, the
safeguarding of the act of faith.
There is an obvious relationship between
this concept of liberty and the appeal which
Leo XIII makes to Thomism. As a philo-
sophical system, Thomism best establishes
the necessary distinction that must be
drawn between the domain of the Church
and the domain of the State. In general,
Thomism distinguishes between faith and
reason. It rejects the tendency to absorb
8 TRACT XXVI IN JOHANNEM, n. 2.
the demands of the natural law into the
sphere of supernatural justice, i.e., the
law of the State into the law of the Church.
According to Arquilli~re, its most compe-
tent historian, this tendency characterized
medieval Augustinian political philosophy.
Yet, in the light of the teachings of St.
Augustine himself, this tendency must be
put down as an oversimplification, for it
does not represent the integrity of his
thought even though the letter of his writ-
ings be pushed to the extreme.
This principle that the positive promo-
tion of the common good demands civil and
religious tolerance is again explicitly de-
fended by Leo XIII in Libertas where the
Pontiff says:
Liberty may also be taken to mean that
every man in the State may follow the will
of God and, from a consciousness of duty
and free from every obstacle, obey His
commands. This indeed is true liberty, a
liberty worthy of the sons of God, which
nobly maintains the dignity of man, and
is stronger than all violence or wrong - a
liberty which the Church has always de-
sired and held most dear. This is the kind
of liberty which the Apostles claimed for
themselves with intrepid constancy, which
the apologists of Christianity affirmed by
their writings, and which the martyrs in
vast numbers consecrated by their blood.
Despite such an authoritative statement,
the idea is prevalent, not only among un-
believers, but among Catholics as well,
that the acceptance of this concept of
liberty is only a concession suggested by
prudence and grudgingly made to the spirit
of the times.
Catholic Tradition
It is, therefore, important to point out
that it was genuine Catholic tradition that
inspired the declarations of Leo XIII,
Pius XI and Pius XII. The principles of
tolerance should be explained not as though
they represent -an effort on the part of the
Church to come to a compromise with the
modern world. On the contrary, they repre-
sent a new development of the permanent
principles of Catholicism - a development
which is capable of assimilating and, at the
same time, purifying what is worthwhile in
modern thought. This development, more-
over, -is accomplished by making more
precise the application of permanent prin-
ciples to new problems.
Roman Catholic tradition is filled with
texts which support such a development. It
is common knowledge that the ancient State
was founded on principles Which confused
the divine and the social, i.e., the religious
and the political, and that Christianity set
for itself the task of separating the things
of Caesar from those of God. Christianity
was far ahead of the State in proclaiming
the absolute value of the human person.
This theme re-echoes throughout the entire
works of Pius XII.
In one of his letters, St. Gregory the
Great wrote:
If, moved by a right intention, you de-
sire to lead to the true faith those who
are outside the Christian fold, you should
use persuasion, not violence. Otherwise
minds which are ripe for enlightenment will
be alienated because of your hostility.
Those who act differently under the pre-
text of bringing men to accept their own
religious traditions show that they are
seeking their own wills rather than the will
of God.
In a letter to the bishops of France,
dated 6th April, 1233, Gregory IX laid
down the lines of conduct to be adopted
in regard to the Jews. He declared: "As
for the Jews, Christians ought to conduct
themselves with the same charity that
they would desire to see used toward
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Christians who live in pagan countries."
This shows that the Sovereign Pontiffs and
the Doctors of the Middle Ages faced the
problem of tolerance in regard to the
Jews. Basically, to-day's position is only
a universalization of their attitude.
Later Innocent III recalled the same
principles to the Archbishop of Arles. "It
is contrary to the Christian religion," he
pointed out, "that a man be forced to be-
come and to remain Christian against his
will and despite his opposition."
Some time later St. Thomas wrote in
the Summa that infidels, such as the Gen-
tiles and the Jews, who have never accepted
the faith should in no manner be forced
to believe, because belief is an act of the
will. When Christians make war on the
infidel, the Angelic Doctor continues, "it is
not to oblige them to accept Christianity;
it is only to force them not to oppose the
faith of Christ." For, as he points out, if
Christians triumph over the infidel and re-
duce him to captivity, they should leave
him his freedom of choice in regard to
religion.
Obvious Olijections
Nevertheless, though it is possible to
show that the Catholic doctrine on relig-
ious tolerance is only a development of
traditional principles, an objection remains:
How did it come to pass that the principles
have been so late in yielding to develop-
ments? We cannot deny that the Inquisi-
tion refused men their freedom of
conscience. Nor can we deny that repre-
sentatives of the Church often praised the
sometimes violent methods employed by
the Counter-Reformation. It is also true
that many of the expressions used by
Gregory XVI and Pius IX are clearly con-
trary to the idea of religious liberty. We
can go further and admit that the distinc-
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
tion we make to-day between the "thesis"
and the "hypothesis" tends to leave the
modern mind perplexed. In seeming to
distinguish between the ideal of tolerance
and the concrete historical situations in
which she has found herself, the Church
appears to have sanctioned a policy which
is based on compromise.
The Answer
In answering these objections it is most
important to realize that the problem of
religious liberty is essentially a modern one.
We must distinguish between the doctrine
of the Church and the impact given his-
torical situations have made on the Church.
Furthermore, it is particularly important
to stress that the Inquisition was never an
essential factor in Church discipline. As an
historical phenomenon, it must be ex-
plained in the light of the spiritual situa-
tion of the Middle Ages. That period was
characterized by a unity of faith which
was lived. There was then no question of
justifying the freedom of the act of faith,
but rather of finding a religious justification
for current cultural values.
With this in mind it is easy to under-
stand why, in the Middle Ages, theologians
directed their attention to objective truth,
leaving in the shadows the subjective aspect
of human adherence to truth. By contrast,
the modern era is called the age of reflec-
tion, because reflection on the subjective
attitudes of the mind is its dominant char-
acteristic.
It was, therefore, natural that the
Middle Ages should have insisted on dog-
matic intolerance, all the while ignoring
the notion of civil tolerance. Granted the
unity of faith characteristic of the Middle
Ages, whoever separated himself from the
Church was a heretic in the formal sense
of the word. One could not then speak of a
plurality of religious beliefs. One did not
inherit heresy. The heretic was persecuted,
not so much for his heresy, as for the delib-
erate separation of himself from the unity
of faith and love which constituted the
religious community. The fundamental rea-
,son why the heretic was persecuted lay not
so much in his error as in his grave per-
sonal culpability, his evil moral disposition.
It should not be astonishing then that the
problem of freedom of consciences was
either not at all or rarely posed during this
period. What is important is to discover if,
in contradistinction to the religious posi-
tions taken by the Church during the
Middle Ages, there are not doctrinal ele-
ments in the teaching of the Roman Church
which would enable her to confront the
problem of religious liberty as we know
that problem to-day. The answer, as we
have already seen, is Yes.
It is only fair to consider the condem-
nations of Gregory XVI and Pius IX in the
light of the adversaries against whom they
were pronounced. They were not concerned
with the distinction between dogmatic and
civil tolerance which we have been stress-
ing. They did insist on total intransigence
on the theoretical plane even to the point
of expecting Catholics to deny all spon-
taneous recognition of religious freedom to
dissenters. But in analysing their state-
ments, we must insist on certain principles
of historical criticism which demand that
any statement be judged in its historical
context - in this case, in relation to the
anti-Catholicism of the time.
Much of what in the nineteenth century
was called Liberalism we to-day would call
radicalism. The Liberalism of the nine-
teenth century very often associated its
political tenets with a view of life which
was distinctly anti-Catholic. The so-called
"declarations of the modern conscience"
were meant to oppose what remained of
the "dark ages." Moreover, the Liberalism
of the nineteenth century was associated
with Freemasonry. This was the age which
not only idolized the figure of Julian the
Apostate, but sought to resume his type
of persecution. (I refer, for example, to
the anticlericalism of the Third Republic of
France and the Laws of Combes.)
Hence the freedom to all cults and to
all opinions preached by Liberalism was,
in the mind of those who promoted it,
practically equivalent to a denial of the
Catholic cult. The Liberals sought to estab-
lish those political and cultural conditions
which would result in the disappearance
from the modern conscience of what they
called "a residue of intolerance." Catholi-
cism, they taught, was no longer adaptable
to progress. In reality they were only estab-
lishing an Inquisition in reverse, in which
ridicule rather than the stake became the
penalty. The Catholic was excluded from
dialogue on the grounds that he repre-
sented a pre-scientific mentality which had
long since been left behind by the irrever-
sible forward march of history.
This exclusion from dialogue represented
a new type of inquisitorial punishment, at
least as serious as those associated with
tradition. But radicalism, in linking free-
dom with anti-supernatural rationalism, was
not denying dogmatism, as it wished the
world to believe. It was rather marking a
transition to a new type of dogmatism -
the dogmatism of the modern conscience.
Thus it was Liberalism itself, at least in its
radical expression, which in the nineteenth
century made the issue one of dogmatism.
It is this fact which explains why the
Sovereign Pontiffs were especially con-
cerned with dogmatic intolerance.
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We have already pointed out that the
reason for dogmatic intolerance is such
that the Church cannot renounce it in any
way. Certainly there were Catholic Liberals
in the nineteenth century -among whom
we may list Cavour who sought during the
last months of his life to reconcile Liber-
alism and Catholicism-but it must be
observed that they, while hazily perceiving
what was legitimate and Christian in the
claims of the modern conscience, were
wrong in not seeing the complexity of the
problem and in general in formulating their
position in terms of compromise.
The adversaries have changed to-day.
The notion that there is an essential con-
nection between anti-supernatural ration-
alism and the affirmation of freedom, in
both the theoretical and practical sense of
the word, is admittedly false. Conditions
are, therefore, ripe for the explanation of
the traditional principles of the Church in
regard to religious tolerance as we have
enunciated them.
To-day, the cause of civilization and the
cause of personal freedom are one and
the same, while the cause of barbarism is
synonymous with an extreme intolerance
which has nothing in common with any
Catholic doctrine.
We have written these lines to demon-
strate that, if the Church to-day leaps to
the defence of human freedom, it is not
because she has been forced by historical
necessity to submit. Nor does her defence
of human freedom mean that she has
entered into a compromise with principles
that are alien to her teaching. In the pres-
ence of a new historical situation the
Church merely affirms the dignity of the
human person and its essential relationship
to the primacy of truth which has. always
been the norm of her teaching and action.
